

Power on the Margins:

Lumpenproletarian Resistance in China and Egypt

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Theorists and activists on the Left have long debated the political orientation of lumpenproletarians. Some have viewed these marginalized people as a potential pawn of ruling elites, while others have argued that they are natural insurgents. However, the group has rarely been a focus of empirical social science research. Scholars of revolution and democratization have instead privileged other classes in their analyses. This may amount to a significant oversight, particularly in developing-world authoritarian regimes, which tend to have large informal sectors.

This article returns to the early historical debates armed with a new definition of lumpenproletarians, a new theory about the group's collective actions, and new evidence from two paradigmatic cases. We first define lumpenproletarians as a particularly marginal class of workers within the urban informal economy, who work mostly on their own in irregular jobs that pay little and require no special training. Importantly, and in contrast to previous conceptualizations of the group, this definition focuses exclusively on the nature of lumpenproletarian work. Then, we theorize that today's lumpenproletarians are likely to be politically disengaged, and that they are therefore unlikely to become permanent members of conventional social movements. However, because the marginal and informal nature of their work brings them into frequent conflict with state authorities, we argue that lumpenproletarians can be drawn into protests over government misconduct, especially police abuse. We evaluate this theory using two cases—China and Egypt—which are both authoritarian countries with large grey economies, but have otherwise had sharply contrasting political trajectories in recent years, namely low-level contention in China versus a revolution and then a popular counterrevolution in Egypt.

One of the challenges with studying lumpenproletarians is that their structural position on the edges of society and their relative absence from academic research leave them poorly captured in existing social science datasets. We therefore rely on a

mixed-methods strategy and fresh sources of data to examine this elusive group. First, we use original protest data alongside news reports and secondary literature to examine the sorts of issues that draw lumpenproletarians into the streets in China. Then we draw on a similar dataset from the period following Egypt's 2011 revolution, which we pair with news reports and original interviews with Egyptian activists and politicians. In Egypt we also study lumpenproletarians by following conflicts involving the country's football ultras, because these sports groups draw their members disproportionately from the ranks of urban youth who live and work in Cairo's informal quarters. The ultras also give us an opportunity to study how lumpenproletarians can act when organized.

Our findings are broadly in line with our theory and lend support, in different ways, to both sides of the old debate over lumpenproletarians' political orientations. We find that in China and Egypt alike, the demonstrations most likely to elicit lumpenproletarian participation are those over issues like fines, crackdowns, and violence by security forces. However, we also find that because of their political disengagement, lumpenproletarians' mobilization, when it occurs, can lead them in very different directions. Specifically, in tracking Egypt's football ultras, we find that these groups were initially a staunchly revolutionary force, motivated by outrage over police repression under Hosni Mubarak, but later a similar set of grievances led them to join the movement against the nascent democratic government of Mohamed Morsi.

We thus conclude that lumpenproletarians do have revolutionary potential, but their political leanings are fluid, and, under certain conditions, their narrow concerns can be coopted for counterrevolutionary ends. As jobs in the developing world become increasingly casual, the orientations and behaviors of marginalized people require more attention in discussions of political stability and change.

A Longstanding Debate: Are Lumpenproletarians Reactionary or Revolutionary?

The political orientation of the lumpenproletariat has historically been the subject of heated dispute. Whereas Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw the industrial working class as the obvious engine of progress, they wrote with a mixture of contempt and concern about its shadowy cousin: the lumpenproletariat. They described this group as a "dangerous class" of "social scum," who might join revolutionary movements here or there but were much more likely to play "the part of the bribed tool of reactionary intrigue."¹ However, not all on the Left held these loose elements in such low regard. The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, for instance, criticized Marx's "disgusting flattery of the more advanced workers."² In his words, "popular insurrection, by its very nature, is instinctive, chaotic, and destructive," and it was precisely in the "unjustly" criticized lumpenproletariat, not the proletariat, that this essential destructive energy was "crystallized."³

This more optimistic perspective achieved further prominence amidst the social movements of the 1960s. Although he bemoaned the group's "lack of political consciousness," anti-colonial theorist Frantz Fanon wrote that "the lumpenproletariat, this cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and clan, constitutes one of the most

spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people.”⁴ Organizations like the Young Lords and the Black Panther Party later embraced Fanon’s theory during their urban mobilizations.⁵ As Clyde W. Barrow explains, interest in the lumpenproletariat then fell out of fashion on the Left in the 1980s, because the category was seen as demeaning and ill-defined, only for conservatives to take up the debate again, focusing on a purported new “white underclass.”⁶

Despite this rich debate, with its clear and opposing viewpoints, more empirically oriented social scientists have rarely engaged the question of whether or how the lumpenproletariat may participate in social movements and revolutions. There is, of course, a distinguished tradition of class analysis in studies of regime change.⁷ For example, scholars have long debated whether the middle class or the working class are the key agents of democratization.⁸ But, with only a few exceptions, the lumpenproletariat has received scant treatment in this scholarship.⁹

Yet, these unresolved issues remain relevant today, particularly because many authoritarian countries have sizeable informal sectors. After the Cold War, a group of authoritarian holdouts famously defied the predictions of the “transitology” paradigm.¹⁰ While these regimes failed to liberalize politically, they did engage in major economic liberalization schemes, dismantling social welfare systems that had been built up during the mid-20th century. Citizens in public sector jobs were placed at the mercy of the market, public services struggled to keep up, and crime rose as police focused their energies on quashing political opposition.¹¹

The questions of earlier eras are thus as urgent as ever. Are lumpenproletarians fundamentally reactionary? Or do they have a latent insurrectionary potential? Under what conditions do they engage in contention? And how do they act when given the space to organize?

Defining and Theorizing Lumpenproletarians Anew

In order to answer these questions, we need a working definition of lumpenproletarians that maintains continuity with the classic debates but also makes sense in the present day, especially in the developing world where questions of revolution and regime change are most relevant. Marx and Engels did not define lumpenproletarians with much specificity. The majority of their writing about the group came in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, whose failure they attributed in part to the pro-regime mobilization of marginalized people.¹² In Engels’ journalistic accounts, his examples of lumpenproletarians included “former beggars, vagabonds, rogues, gutter-snipes, and small time thieves”; he later described them as “people without a definite occupation and a stable domicile.”¹³ In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte*, Marx included “vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni*, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, *maquereaux* [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, *litterati*, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars.”¹⁴

Building off these somewhat scattered descriptions, we define lumpenproletarians as a particularly marginal class of workers within the urban informal economies of the developing world: those who work mostly on their own, in irregular jobs that pay them little, and who have little or no special training. Our conceptualization is thus based on specific aspects of the group's working life in the informal sector.¹⁵

These criteria set lumpenproletarians apart from other commonly used social categories. First, we distinguish the lumpenproletariat from workers in other parts of the urban informal economy, where people might be employed essentially full-time in trades that entail considerable training or as groups in small commercial enterprises or unregistered factories.¹⁶ Second, we differentiate lumpenproletarians from what some call "the precariat." This term, which was first used by Robert Castel and later elaborated by Guy Standing, refers to people who lack different forms of security, including work security, representation security, etc.¹⁷ However, it has mostly been applied to workers in the advanced industrial economies of the Global North,¹⁸ and it includes everyone from independent software contractors and "gig" workers to recent refugees.¹⁹ Third, we consider the lumpenproletariat to be a broader category than common criminals. It is true that some lumpenproletarians engage in blatantly illicit activities, while many others, because of the informal and irregular nature of their work, may be forced to skirt the law in smaller ways. But we do not see the lumpenproletariat as a group defined by criminality.

Based on our definition, we can generate some preliminary theoretical expectations about the conditions under which this group might join movements or protests in today's authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, we expect lumpenproletarians to be unlikely participants in traditional political mobilization. The group is largely sidelined from mainstream political institutions. For example, Partha Chatterjee writes of a broad swath of people, the "governed," who resemble the lumpenproletariat because they "transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work."²⁰ He points out that these people lack access to the government and to non-governmental organizations, and must consequently "pick their way through this uncertain terrain."²¹ Lumpenproletarians are also unlikely to follow shop floor mobilization patterns typical of the traditional proletariat. As noted by Rina Agarwala, informal sectors in general do not exhibit conventional class hierarchies,²² and this is likely to be especially true for those who work on their own in irregular and flexible employment arrangements.²³ Without entry points into formal politics or antagonistic relations with employers, we would expect lumpenproletarians to eschew participation in most mainstream social movements.

Yet, other characteristics of lumpenproletarians might lead us to expect greater mobilizational potential. For example, their lack of regular work commitments means that they have fewer practical constraints on joining protests, i.e., they are what Doug McAdam called "biographically available" for mobilization.²⁴ They also, in the words of Asef Bayat, "operate, subsist, socialize, and simply live a life in ... public spaces," making them ready participants in "street politics."²⁵

Moreover, though they are unlikely to be animated by classic political or labor concerns, we expect lumpenproletarians to maintain a unique, visceral set of grievances

against the state and its agents. Particularly in developing countries, the group has been the target of persistent state initiatives to “clean up” society and render marginalized spaces “governable.”²⁶ Most basically, because lumpenproletarians’ work often occurs on the boundary between legality and illegality—as Marx, Engels, and Chatterjee all highlight—they tend to have conflictual relationships with street-level authorities, particularly the police. For example, they are constantly being forced to pay fines and bribes and to evade police harassment. This is true even of people with more “respectable” vocations, like taxi drivers, who may be unable to obtain the correct licenses. Bayat similarly notes that the “encroachments” of street vendors onto public squares may be tolerated at first, but eventually elicit brutal police crackdowns, which may in turn generate explosive collective resistance.²⁷ It should be emphasized again that lumpenproletarians do not necessarily commit crimes (large or small) for a living; it is more, as Bayat explains, that the nature of their work requires them to engage in morally justifiable but nevertheless unlawful or semi-legal acts. As states in the developing world seek to tame their informal sectors, conflicts between state agents and lumpenproletarians ought also to rise, leading to escalating lumpenproletarian grievances (a subject we return to in the Conclusion).

One final point concerns the organizations that lumpenproletarians may join or form. Bayat suggests that the urban poor eschew formal organizations altogether.²⁸ We argue instead that lumpenproletarian organizations may exist, but are likely to look different than classic labor unions, student movements, or middle-class civil society organizations (a point also made by Chatterjee).²⁹ Lumpenproletarian collectives may be less formal and more networked; for example, the more criminal elements of the lumpenproletariat may form protection rings, gangs, or cartels. Street vendors in Iran and Egypt have occasionally attempted to create unions to protect themselves from crackdowns. Others may organize around leisure or pastimes, such as sports clubs or ultras associations. Ultimately, levels of lumpenproletarian organization depend largely on the political context. In states where regulation of the informal sector and civil society is heavy-handed (like China) lumpenproletarian organization may be minimal; in less overbearing states (like Egypt) lumpenproletarian organizations may be able to thrive.

Ultimately, then, we have a somewhat competing set of predictions regarding lumpenproletarians’ political behavior. First, we do not expect this group to join more traditional social movements organized around political or labor demands. Second, though, we do expect them to be comparatively unconstrained and to have a pointed set of grievances against the state, especially the police. Third, levels of lumpenproletarian organization depend on the degree of control exercised by authorities in their countries. For all these reasons, we concur with Marx and Engels that lumpenproletarians are unlikely to be the primary agents of revolution, but we believe that they may episodically erupt in protest on their own initiative or join the campaigns of others, provided issues of government misconduct are at stake. Indeed, paradoxically, we believe that the narrowness and immediacy of this group’s grievances mean that their protests have the potential to be coopted and channeled by a wide variety of movements.

Case Selection: China vs. Egypt

We select two cases to study the behaviors of contemporary lumpenproletarians: China and Egypt. These are both developing countries with histories of state socialism that have more recently embraced free-market economic policies. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, China ripped up its “socialist social contract,” throwing out of work millions who had experienced cradle-to-grave benefits via state-owned enterprises.³⁰ Some people joined private enterprises with formal contracts, but Albert Park and Fang Cai show that an astonishing number—up to about a third of the total workforce—ended up in informal jobs.³¹ Crime consequently rose dramatically across China.³² In Egypt, the story is similar. Beginning in the 1970s, the country began to dismantle the large public sector that had been constructed after the 1952 Revolution. Over the ensuing decades, the quality of public services eroded and the number of well-paid middle-class jobs shrank. As in China, a large informal sector emerged in its place, and this sector now accounts for roughly half of all non-agricultural jobs.³³

Both states have also been anxious to make their marginalized populations amenable to “governance.”³⁴ In China, these people were the target of moral reform campaigns in the mid-twentieth century and then “strike hard” crackdowns in the 1980s and 1990s.³⁵ Harriet Evans describes how pedicab operators, trinket hawkers, lavatory cleaners, and others in a poor neighborhood of Beijing have seen their lives upended by a recent urban cleanup effort led by municipal authorities.³⁶ In Egypt, the state has oscillated between reluctantly allowing the informal sector to flourish and trying to control it.³⁷ In recent years, for example, there has been a concerted push to clear informal vendors from central streets and squares in Cairo.³⁸ Additionally, of course, both China and Egypt have had authoritarian political systems in place since the mid-twentieth century and throughout their marketization processes: a Communist Party-led regime in China and a military-led regime in Egypt.

Although China and Egypt have similar political economies and regime types, their recent political histories could not be more different. China is a relatively stable and well-consolidated authoritarian regime and has not seen major anti-regime contention since the Tiananmen protests of 1989 (outside of Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang). Instead, over the last two decades, contention in China has generally been low scale, if persistent and widespread, focusing on issues like land and property, the environment, and labor rights.³⁹ In contrast, Egypt has seen explosive unrest targeted directly at the government. Under Hosni Mubarak, the former authoritarian leader, formal opposition movements were marginalized and repressed, but there was still considerable space for groups of different stripes to organize and mobilize. In part due to this limited openness, Mubarak was overthrown in 2011 by a democratic revolution. These revolutionary gains were then reversed two and a half years later when the Egyptian military staged a counterrevolutionary coup.⁴⁰

Selecting these two cases therefore allows us to study lumpenproletarians in two distinct political contexts, giving us greater leverage on the theoretical questions raised above. Specifically, our study partially follows the logic of a most-different-systems comparison,⁴¹ where we study a pair of authoritarian countries that have

experienced markedly divergent patterns of state-society relations. If lumpenproletarians in China, where the authoritarian regime is strong and stable, behave in similar ways to lumpenproletarians in Egypt's more open political climate and during the chaos of its revolution, then we can infer that this behavior is related to their structural position within the economy and may be similar in other authoritarian states with recent histories of marketization and informalization. At the same time, the differences between the two cases allow us to study how distinct political contexts affect the nature and trajectory of lumpenproletarian mobilization.

Lumpenproletarians under China's Stable Authoritarianism

To examine the question of whether and when lumpenproletarians engage in contention under conditions of stable authoritarianism with little space for organization, we first consider the case of China. Some scholars have explored the participation of marginalized people in pre-revolutionary banditry and the country's 1949 revolution,⁴² while others have documented phenomena like protests involving rural martial arts brotherhoods.⁴³ But a more comprehensive analysis of the political role of Chinese lumpenproletarians is missing. We begin by using a protest event dataset, China Strikes, to examine the issues that tend to draw lumpenproletarians into the streets. Our findings suggest that, in line with our theory, state abuse and particularly fines and police harassment are more likely to attract these individuals' participation. Then, drawing on newspaper and Internet reports, as well as secondary literature, we analyze several of the incidents from China Strikes, along with some high-profile incidents not captured by the dataset, to unpack the mechanisms behind the statistical relationships. Across the conflicts, we note again a recurrent theme of government misconduct as a spark for unrest, especially officials' interventions to "clean up" different sectors. We also identify consistent patterns of protester spontaneity, a lack of overtly political demands, and idle bystanders joining disputes.

Evidence from Event Data To examine what sorts of claims tend to involve lumpenproletarians in protests, we first draw on Manfred Elfstrom's China Strikes dataset, which includes 1,471 strikes, protests, and riots involving Chinese workers between the years 2003 and 2012.⁴⁴ China Strikes is based on state media, foreign media, social media, and dissident sources.⁴⁵ In the context of this dataset, we code as instances of lumpenproletarian resistance any events that involve the following groups: taxi drivers, beauty parlor and spa workers, sex workers, tourism workers, janitors and cleaners, and any workers who are self-employed. It could be argued that certain of these groups overlap with the lower rungs of the *petit bourgeoisie*. However, we have excluded small shopkeepers, licensed or not, as well as people working in hotels and restaurants or in certain light industries. These people frequently lack contracts and therefore might belong to the broader informal sector, but their work is not as individual and/or irregular as required by our definition of lumpenproletarians. For some of the groups, such as sanitation workers and taxi drivers, there is considerable variety in the ownership structures under which they labor and their financial

status, from comfortable and fully licensed self-employment to precariously sub-contracted or altogether illegal employment (e.g., drivers operating outlawed motorcycle taxis).⁴⁶ Though most of the workers in these groups would qualify as lumpenproletarian by our definition, some of them likely would not. Because taxi drivers, in particular, also account for a large number of incidents, we run all the analyses below with and without them.

We are interested in assessing what types of protest demands elicit lumpenproletarian participation. For each protest, the dataset includes variables capturing the types of demands raised. Most of the disputes involve traditional labor issues like work injury compensation and wage increases, but there are a minority that feature demands directly targeting the government. Within government-related contention there is also a sub-category of protests over fines and police harassment. Because our theory holds that lumpenproletarians should be particularly drawn to protests involving state misconduct and abuse by security services, we are interested in both the broad government-related category and the police-related sub-category.

In our analyses, we estimate four logistic regression models. Our dependent variable in all the models is a binary one, measuring whether lumpenproletarians were involved in a given dispute or not (1 if so, 0 if not). Our independent variables then capture the various types of demands that were raised in the course of the conflicts. Because some incidents involve more than one demand, each demand is treated as a binary variable and there is no reference group. There are 262 incidents in the dataset that include lumpenproletarians as we define the group (about 18 percent of the total). Of these, 205 involve taxi drivers. Our demand variables include three major categories: demands concerning *working conditions* (e.g., issues over wages, layoffs, work-related injuries, union representation); demands relating to *market conditions* (e.g., competition, fuel prices); and *government-related* demands, which include demands over police fines and violence, corruption, and local policies stripping workers of their self-employed status. We also estimate models where only the sub-category of fine- and police-related demands are included in place of general government-related demands. Given China's regional variation in labor markets, as well as the potential for geographic biases in incident reporting, we include provincial fixed effects. We also add year fixed effects to account for the periodic tightening and loosening of political control.

The results from these analyses can be found in Table 1, which displays odds ratios from our logistic regressions. Incidents featuring government-related demands of any sort are nearly fourteen times more likely to involve lumpenproletarians as incidents without such demands (M1). When taxi drivers are excluded, lumpenproletarians are still about three times as likely to be involved (M2). If the demands are over fines or police harassment, specifically, lumpenproletarians are about twenty-four times as likely to be involved, when taxi drivers are included (M3). Here, when taxi drivers are excluded, lumpenproletarians are about twice as likely to be involved (though results are not statistically significant at normal levels) (M4). In contrast, market conditions have a less consistent relationship with lumpenproletarian involvement: they significantly increase the odds of involvement if taxi drivers are treated as lumpenproletarians, but not if they are excluded. This is likely

Table 1 Likelihood of Chinese Lumpenproletarians Joining Labor Protests (Odds Ratios)

	<i>Dependent variable: Lumpenproletarian participation</i>			
	M1 (w/ taxi drivers)	M2 (w/o taxi drivers)	M3 (w/ taxi drivers)	M4 (w/o taxi drivers)
Working conditions	0.231*** (0.057)	0.537* (0.174)	0.286**** (0.067)	0.549* (0.177)
Market conditions	42.799*** (11.295)	0.606 (0.294)	30.000**** 7.547	0.580 (0.281)
Government-related	13.670*** (3.538)	2.873*** (1.073)		
Police and fine-related			24.445**** (12.111)	2.203 (1.512)
Constant	0.125** (0.108)	0.0288*** (0.038)	0.472 (0.367)	0.047 (0.061)
Provincial FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,470	1,285	1,470	1,285
Log Likelihood	-394.455	-212.7	-422.441	-215.732
Akaike Inf. Crit.	872.910	491.441	928.882	497.464

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

because many taxi protests were either over fuel prices or directed at “black cabs,” which we code as a competition issue. In both sets of events, drivers were often angry over government practices, i.e., either corrupt government protection of illegal operators or reluctance to offer gas subsidies. In line with our expectations, more traditional labor concerns over working conditions show a consistently negative relationship with lumpenproletarian participation. The results suggest that protests targeting the state and the police are the ones that disproportionately draw in this group.

Lumpenproletarian Protests in China: Qualitative Evidence While the statistical analyses above provide support for some of our theoretical expectations about the grievances over which lumpenproletarians tend to mobilize, there is only so much we can learn from bare correlations. We still need to interrogate the processes by which people mobilize. Moreover, because China Strikes only includes labor protests, it does not cover the full range of actions in which lumpenproletarians may be involved. We therefore conduct brief qualitative analyses of several conflicts from China Strikes, as well as a number of other high-profile (and therefore well-documented) conflicts not captured by the dataset. These narratives together allow us to trace the mechanisms facilitating the escalation of confrontations between marginalized Chinese people and state authorities, while capturing more of the grievances that have sparked such confrontations. Along the

way we bolster our claim that state and particularly police abuse are key drivers of lumpenproletarian contention, and we provide evidence for other elements of our theory, especially our claims that lumpenproletarians are relatively removed from formal politics, that their activism is often spontaneous, and that the group is biographically available for protest.

We begin with several representative examples drawn directly from the China Strikes dataset. In November 2006, the northeastern city of Changchun banned unlicensed pedicabs, as part of a clean-up ahead of the Asian Winter Games. Many of the drivers were laid-off workers and could not afford the new license fees. They therefore launched a sit-in at the gates of one of the city's district governments.⁴⁷ A similar protest occurred in 2012, when motorcycle cab drivers in Huzhou, Zhejiang Province were forced to buy new motorcycles or have their old vehicles destroyed.⁴⁸ In 2006, when authorities tried to bring order to Sichuan's famous Jiuzhaigou scenic area by charging self-employed tour guides various fees to enter, hundreds of these workers protested.⁴⁹ The same year, workers in massage parlors and dance clubs in Shenzhen clashed with police over an ongoing anti-vice crackdown in the city.⁵⁰ When authorities launched a nationwide campaign against the sex industry in 2010, sex workers in Wuhan, Hubei Province, led by the activist Ye Haiyan, protested and asked passersby to sign a petition against anti-prostitution laws.⁵¹ This last incident represents a remarkably well-organized and disciplined action, but it is something of the exception that proves the rule. Indeed, most of these incidents took the form of brief and brilliant flashes. And, throughout, government action was the clear spur to mobilization. Specifically, anger was sparked by officials moving to control a disorderly sector and thereby undermining people's livelihoods. But broad political claims were lacking; a simple end to a hated government intervention is all that these protests demanded.

Discussing some particularly high-profile and well-documented incidents from outside the dataset makes these dynamics even clearer, while highlighting other factors unique to lumpenproletarian protest. In 2011, in the blue jeans manufacturing hub of Zengcheng, Guangdong Province, there were several days of riots after police allegedly manhandled a pregnant Sichuanese woman, Wang Lianmei, who was peddling used clothing outside a supermarket. According to eyewitnesses, hundreds of angry people, many of them fellow migrants from Sichuan, gathered when police scattered the goods Wang and her husband were selling and shoved her to the ground, drawing blood. Those hundreds of people subsequently grew into the thousands, with protesters torching police cars and government buildings until paramilitary units were deployed and a curfew imposed.⁵²

The 2008 "Weng'an Incident" in Guizhou Province, meanwhile, started when a young woman, Li Shufen, drowned in a river and her family suspected foul play by individuals close to the local security apparatus. When her uncle complained to the police and was beaten, Li's classmates launched a march for justice, which drew in bystanders with "low social status," especially people for hire at job markets or selling goods on the street ("small peddlers who rise early and go to bed late").⁵³ The journalist Buzhi Ding notes that the march really began to swell when it entered an area with massage parlors and consignment shops with gang connections. Soon it was a full-blown riot.⁵⁴ Of the 104 young people arrested following the violence, eighteen belonged to gangs.⁵⁵

Finally, in 2009, in Shishou, Hubei Province, police ruled the death of a hotel chef a suicide and rushed to cremate his body, but the chef's family suspected he had been murdered by hotel managers protected by corrupt authorities. The family insisted on an autopsy. Crowds then gathered and fought with police, who repeatedly tried to take the body away. Rioters eventually burned down the hotel and destroyed police cars, stopping only when the internet was cut off to the area.⁵⁶ Authorities later blamed "criminals" for running amuck. Interestingly, though, Jinghong Zhang provides evidence that the family at the center of the dispute offered material incentives to local vendors, drug addicts, and ex-convicts to join their protest, and these people in turn used their contacts to form a bigger crowd.⁵⁷

In each of these incidents, in keeping with our statistical analysis, unrest was driven by grievances focused on the state, especially police abuse. Moreover, we see that the protesters' demands lacked a clear political program. The events were chaotic, but like the China Strikes conflicts, they dissolved nearly as rapidly as they sprang up (Jianrong Yu has described the "Weng'an incident" as "anger-venting").⁵⁸ Importantly, too, all of the showdowns appear to have drawn in large numbers of idle bystanders. As noted above, lumpenproletarians are biographically available for mobilization, because they do not work fixed hours and are not supervised by formal employers. Lumpenproletarian mobilization may have greater impact when the group has organizations of its own and can link up with broader social movements. We explore this question further in the next section, focusing on the case of Egypt.

Lumpenproletarians in Egypt's 2011 Revolution

In the previous section, we showed how lumpenproletarians in China may be disengaged from formal politics and traditional labor disputes but are sometimes drawn into spontaneous protest over state misconduct, with explosive, if ultimately contained, effects. In this section we turn to analysis of Egypt, which allows us to examine the mobilization of the group during periods of relative political openness and chaotic revolutionary regime change, with ample space for autonomous social organization. Specifically, here, we are interested in the conditions under which lumpenproletarians' fairly narrow and nebulous grievances (i.e., anger over government and police abuse) may "scale up," motivating them to participate in overtly political movements that they might, during normal times, eschew or disdain. Again, we face the challenge of how best to identify and study this elusive social sector. In this section we therefore take a twofold approach. First, just as we did in the second China section, we use newspaper accounts to analyze protests involving lumpenproletarians during the revolution and the post-revolutionary transition. Second, we hone in on the political behaviors of Egypt's football ultras, a group whose members are disproportionately lumpenproletarian. Analyzing the ultras is helpful for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, because the group is fairly well-defined, it is easier to study and track them than other lumpenproletarian actors, particularly during chaotic revolutionary times. Theoretically, studying the ultras allows

us to see how lumpenproletarians behave when they have preexisting organization, a phenomenon that is precluded by heavy-handed repression in China.

Our findings broadly resonate with those from the previous section, but they also yield several additional insights. First, we show that lumpenproletarians in Egypt exhibit strikingly similar patterns of mobilization to those in China, even during revolutionary times. These people did participate in the protests of the revolution and the post-revolution transition, but they did so episodically and only when the issues at stake related directly to state or police abuse. Second, we find that such abuse was also a primary motivation for ultras' participation in the 2011 revolution and that during the post-revolution transition ultras were statistically more likely to join protests over government abuse or repression. Third, we demonstrate that the ultras' additional organizational resources led them to engage in far more sustained mobilization during the transition, though, again, these campaigns were mostly focused on issues of government misconduct. These rather narrow and specific grievances, however, made the ultras available for cooptation by movements of different stripes. Specifically, we find that though the ultras began as a concertedly revolutionary force, by the end of the transition they had turned against the democratically elected government and linked themselves to the counterrevolutionary movement that ousted it.

Lumpenproletarians During the Revolution: Qualitative Evidence Egypt's 2011 revolution has been framed largely as a middle-class affair. During the uprising, international and domestic media focused on the highly visible (and charismatic) youth movement leaders who organized the initial protests.⁵⁹ Yet, subsequent research has called attention to other social forces in the revolution, including workers, rural villagers, and residents of Egypt's vast informal urban quarters.⁶⁰ In order to understand the degree to which lumpenproletarians joined the eighteen-day uprising, we scoured articles from two major Arabic-language daily newspapers—*al-Masry al-Youm* and *al-Shorouk*—to identify incidences of mobilization by people like those we examined in China (e.g., taxi or minibus drivers, tourism workers, and street vendors). We also examined existing ethnographic scholarship on the topic.

This analysis yielded dozens of examples of lumpenproletarian participation in protest during the revolution, and these examples evinced striking similarities with the patterns of mobilization that we observed in China.⁶¹ In many cases, lumpenproletarians were spurred into protest not by middle-class revolutionaries calling for democracy and social justice, but by more direct grievances over state infractions or abuse. For example, a street vendor by the name of Abdel Alim Abdel Samee told one newspaper that he had decided to join the protests only because his son had been killed by the police.⁶² A similar message was conveyed by Ahmed Abdel Fattah Mahmoud, a taxi driver whose eldest son had been martyred during the demonstrations.⁶³ In some cases lumpenproletarians protested specific government agencies that were responsible for onerous regulations or fees. For example, on February 8 a group of taxi drivers demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Finance over a particularly hefty monthly fee they were required to pay.⁶⁴ Similar protests and strikes of taxi drivers occurred in Luxor, Fayoum, and Cairo, also

over fees and licensing.⁶⁵ And in the small city of Benha a group of microbus drivers gathered in a parking complex to protest the imposition of arbitrary fines.⁶⁶ However, like in China, none of these campaigns were particularly sustained; they generally only lasted one day. And although they occurred as part of a broader revolutionary wave, there is no evidence that any of these lumpenproletarian workers linked up with or joined revolutionary organizations.

A particularly valuable source concerning lumpenproletarian participation in the 2011 revolution is the ethnographic research of Salwa Ismail, who has written about the underappreciated role of “urban subalterns” in the uprising.⁶⁷ As Bayat points out, the term “urban subaltern” has often been used by scholars on the Left as a stand-in for the term “lumpenproletariat,” which, as we note above, has taken on negative connotations in some quarters.⁶⁸ In reading Ismail’s account, it is clear that the individuals she has in mind are indeed members of the lumpenproletariat as we have conceptualized it here.⁶⁹ Moreover, the patterns of mobilization she describes are similar to those laid out above. For example, she analyzes an explosive series of battles staged in Cairo’s urban informal quarters during the revolution which saw police facing off against neighborhood residents and vendors. In one battle, which occurred in the al-Moski informal market of Old Cairo, merchants, vendors, and residents threw stones and Molotov cocktails as the security forces fired live bullets. The antagonisms motivating these clashes, she explains:

arose in conjunction with police campaigns on the market, which included routine confiscations of goods. Because the area attracts many tourists, it is subjected to added security surveillance, and workers from the area’s shops and workshops were often targeted by police practices of *ishtibah wa tahari* (stop and investigation). ... In this setting, the quarter-based street battles connected with ongoing struggles against government practices that undermined the area’s livelihood.⁷⁰

Official abuse was again key to lumpenproletarian resistance.

News reports show that government crackdowns also spurred episodic incidents of lumpenproletarian mobilization during the post-revolutionary transition. Many of these protests occurred in the context of efforts to clear streets and squares of illegal vendors. For example, in October 2012 security forces attempted to remove street vendors from Giza Square; however, the vendors had been warned that the raid was coming and responded with fierce resistance, including use of firearms. One of the vendors was killed in the ensuing two-hour battle, prompting four days of follow-up protests in which the vendors demanded justice for their murdered colleague and the establishment of a new site for their businesses.⁷¹ Similar protests by street vendors denouncing police abuse and efforts to remove them from central squares occurred in Gharbia, Dakhalia, and Suez in the first half of 2013.⁷² However, none of these protests morphed into a sustained campaign, nor were there efforts by vendors in different parts of the country to coordinate their actions. Like in China, the events flared up but then quickly died out. These patterns contrast with the sustained mobilization of Egypt’s football ultras through the revolution and the post-revolution period, the subject of the next section.

Football Ultras during the Revolution The ultras associations attached to Egypt's main football teams allow us to analyze how lumpenproletarians mobilize when they have organizational resources. Though the associations' members are united primarily by love for particular football clubs, and therefore exhibit some diversity in class background, the vast majority come from class positions best described as lumpenproletarian. Indeed, the ultras were in many ways founded and structured specifically to draw in people from this group. The associations were established in 2007 largely in reaction to the preexisting fan associations, which were seen as too corporate and too closely affiliated with the clubs' management.⁷³ One of the ultras' first decisions was to do away with membership fees, so as to open up access to die-hard supporters from the poor informal neighborhoods of Cairo. The groups also set up more decentralized structures of organization, with local leaders from these various quarters empowered to recruit and organize members from among their neighbors.⁷⁴ During the revolution, the ultras' strong connections with these neighborhoods and with individuals engaged in less socially respectable forms of work became a problem for them, as they were often denigrated as *beltegeyya* (thugs) by the Egyptian media.⁷⁵

There is additional evidence to support the claim that the ultras were primarily a lumpenproletarian organization. First, scholars who have studied the ultras are consistent in noting their roots in Cairo's urban informal quarters. Crucially, Ismail analyzes ultras' mobilization extensively, invoking them as an example of the city's urban subaltern.⁷⁶ Second, we were able to gain insight into the social and class positions of ultras members from two unusual sources. The first is a study in Arabic called *The Legend of the Ultras*, which was conducted by three Egyptian researchers.⁷⁷ The team interviewed fifty members of the two main Cairo ultras groups. Although the members were not asked about their work, they were asked about their home neighborhoods. Of the five parts of Cairo where the members lived (Ain Shams, Shubra, Haram, Manshiet Nasser, and Heliopolis), all but one are urban informal quarters with large numbers of lumpenproletarian residents (of the type Ismail focuses on in her study). A similar pattern emerges from a second data source. In February 2012, a riot in the northern city of Port Said following a football match led to the deaths of seventy-four ultras, primarily from the visiting club Al Ahly (we discuss this event in more detail below). The names and home neighborhoods of these martyred ultras members were collected by the data organization Wikithawra. Using these data, we found that the ultras who died in the Port Said massacre disproportionately came from urban informal neighborhoods in Cairo, like Imbaba, Bulaq al-Dakrouf, Faysal, and Shubra. In the Appendix, we include a list of these neighborhoods with the number of martyrs from each one.

Similar to lumpenproletarian mobilization in the Chinese case and the less organized confrontations involving Egyptian lumpenproletarians described above, grievances over state and, especially, security forces' abuses seem to have been major catalysts for ultras protests during the revolution. Before 2011 the ultras were avowedly apolitical organizations; as El-Zatmah puts it, they expressed "disenchantment, despair and distrust of politics."⁷⁸ But because officers would often beat and harass their members, both

inside the stadiums and after matches, the ultras came to view the police as their ultimate enemies.⁷⁹ These grievances were undoubtedly compounded by the regular hostile interactions with security forces that many of these members would have had in their home neighborhoods (the kind of interactions that Ismail documents). Negative experiences with the police drew many ultras to sympathize with the revolution's initial demands: the first protest of the revolution was held on the country's annual "Police Day" holiday, a decision meant by organizers to call attention to issues of police abuse.⁸⁰ Although the ultras associations did not officially endorse the protests, citing their apolitical orientation, they said their members were free to participate.⁸¹ As a result, many ultras turned out for these first demonstrations or joined in once they saw them escalating. The importance of their participation, particularly in fighting the police, was noted by several activists during interviews. One activist from the 6 April Youth movement explained the ultras' crucial role in these clashes:

The most important things on [January] 28th were the clashes and the fighting. We coordinated with the football ultras, from Ahly and Zamalek, and they were at the front line. They hate the police and they agreed to come because it was a chance to fight the police. Before they had protested in the stadiums, but not in political protests. ... They know how to fight and they know how to escape from teargas. They have thousands and they used Facebook and mobile phones [to coordinate]. But they participated only because it was against the police.⁸²

The ultras were thus not merely one group of protest participants among many; they were drawn into the revolution largely because of their animosity toward the police and then played a key role in resisting police attacks.

Animosity toward security forces continued to animate ultras' protests during the post-revolution transition. Ultras often joined demonstrations targeting the military, whose Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had taken over temporary management of the country and who the ultras generally viewed as an embodiment of the security state.⁸³ One of the main catalysts for ultras participation in these protests was the February 2012 riot mentioned above. The incident, known as the Port Said massacre, began with a football match on February 1 between Port Said's Al Masry club and Al Ahly from Cairo. After the match ended, members of Port Said's ultras, the Green Eagles, attacked and trampled the fans of Al Ahly, resulting in seventy-four deaths and hundreds of injuries. Although the aggressors in these attacks were the Green Eagles, the loss of life was widely blamed on the military and the police, whose members not only stood aside and allowed the attacks to occur, but also apparently locked the gates to the stadium, preventing the Ahly fans from escaping.⁸⁴ Members of Al Ahly's ultras (the Ultras Ahlawy) responded immediately with an intense cycle of protest, in which they called for justice for the victims and denounced the complicity of Egypt's security state. Then, in January 2013, a court in Port Said sentenced a number of Port Said ultras to death for their involvement in the massacre. Now it was the Port Said ultras' turn to take to the streets, outraged at what they saw as a punitive and unfair ruling. In the days after the verdicts were announced, the ultras and their families, as well as everyday residents

of Port Said, virtually shut down the city with riots, leading to the announcement of a municipal state of emergency and the deployment of the military. This series of events exhibited some of the same properties that we highlighted in the Chinese lumpenproletarian protests: they were set off by violent state action; the protesters' grievances were fairly narrow and nebulous, more an expression of outrage than a clear set of demands; and the conflict was extremely intense and escalated quickly.

Ultras Protest: Evidence from Event Data The finding that ultras were disproportionately drawn into protests over police abuse is also substantiated by statistical analysis. Here we draw on another original protest dataset, constructed by Killian Clarke and covering the final eighteen months of the Egyptian transition.⁸⁵ These data include every contentious event in Egypt from January 1, 2012 to July 3, 2013 ($n = 7,522$) that was reported in *al-Masry al-Youm*, a major Arabic-language daily newspaper in Egypt.⁸⁶ The dataset includes information on approximately eighty variables associated with each event, including the date, location, demands, and types of participants. One of the participant categories is "ultras," and this variable allows us to measure with relative precision the number, timing, and demands of ultras' protests over this period. According to these data, there were 309 events involving ultras, representing 4 percent of the sample. In the Appendix, we include figures showing the temporal distribution of ultras' protests.

As in the previous section on China, we can evaluate statistically the types of issues that were most likely to elicit ultras' participation. The dataset includes categories for primary and secondary demands; for example, a primary demand category, like "labor," would then have several secondary demand categories within it (e.g., "wages," "hiring," and "working conditions"). These primary demand categories include: human rights abuses, corruption, environmental issues, formal political demands (divided into national, international, and local), social issues, labor demands, security demands, and religious demands. Unlike the China Strikes dataset, these categories are captured with a single categorical variable measuring the main demand, rather than a series of binary variables. Table 2 shows odds ratios from logistic regressions modeling the likelihood of ultras' participation in protests over different types of issues (the reference demand category is *Corruption*). M1 includes just the demand variable, M2 adds governorate fixed effects, and M3 controls for the tactic of the protest. The only category that is significantly associated with ultras' participation is human rights abuses; ultras are five to seven times more likely to join these types of protests than they are protests over corruption. No other type of protest draws in lumpenproletarians like this, though (as in China) traditional labor conflicts tend to drive them away. Moreover, if we dive even deeper and examine the secondary demand categories most likely to elicit ultras' participation, we find that "police abuse" (a subcategory of "human rights abuses") is the demand with the strongest positive relationship (see Appendix). In other words, we find that during the transition, ultras were far more likely to mobilize over issues of police abuse than other types of claims.

However, if ultras exhibited similarities with other lumpenproletarians in the types of grievances that motivated them into action, other important aspects of their mobilization differed. Unlike the lumpenproletarian workers in China and Egypt, the ultras' campaigns

Table 2 Likelihood of Egyptian Ultras Joining Protests (Odds Ratios)


	<i>Dependent variable: Ultras participation</i>		
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
Human Rights Abuses	6.869*** (4.967)	6.191** (4.511)	4.817** (3.545)
Labor	0.054*** (0.050)	0.057*** (0.053)	0.065*** (0.061)
Politics (international)	0.482 (0.446)	0.492 (0.457)	0.322 (0.302)
Politics (local)	0.000 (0.0004)	0.000 (0.0002)	0.000 (0.0001)
Politics (national)	1.267 (0.918)	1.261 (0.921)	0.894 (0.661)
Religious	0.405 (0.501)	0.428 (0.531)	0.283 (0.353)
Security	0.292 (0.269)	0.275 (0.256)	0.255 (0.239)
Social	0.557 (0.421)	0.594 (0.453)	0.560 (0.431)
Environmental	0.000 (0.0003)	0.000 (0.0002)	0.000 (0.0001)
Constant	0.031*** (0.022)	0.043*** (0.033)	0.000 (0.00001)
Governorate FEs		✓	✓
Tactic Controls			✓
Observations	7,522	7,522	7,522
Log Likelihood	-1,076.808	-1,019.998	-982.701
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,173.616	2,113.997	2,061.401

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

did not die out; instead, they continued protesting for months. Though ultras had never been political groups—in fact, as noted above, they had always been avowedly apolitical—once their members were drawn into the streets through incidents like the Port Said massacre, they were able to deploy their organizational resources to sustain these campaigns. The Ahlawy ultras in Cairo were particularly determined; they staged protests throughout the transition, both under SCAF and under Mohamed Morsi's government, consistently demanding that justice be served for their fallen comrades in the Port Said massacre.

In the context of these prolonged campaigns, we see a second dynamic that we did not observe among other lumpenproletarians: the scaling up of demands and claims to target national political authorities. In our other examples of protests in China and Egypt the claims-making was targeted at the local authorities who were most directly responsible for the abuse in question. But over the course of the ultras' campaign, we see that they began to hold national political authorities accountable for the atrocities in Port Said.

Figure 1 Monthly Distribution of Demands in Ultras' Protests



The specific national authorities targeted shifted too. The dataset codes two additional demand variables: one measures whether an event expressed opposition to SCAF and one whether it expressed opposition to Morsi. In Figure 1, we plot the monthly distribution of these two demands within ultras' protests over our eighteen-month period. We also include a dotted line marking the handover of power from SCAF to Morsi. As is evident in the figure, a large proportion of ultras' protests (over 50 percent) expressed opposition to at least one of the main national authorities that ruled Egypt during the transition. During the period of SCAF rule, many ultras' protests (62 percent) focused on the military, which the ultras held partly accountable for the massacre in Port Said. As one ultras member put it in an interview after the massacre: "The massacre crystallized the enmity between us and the SCAF."⁸⁷ More interestingly, though, we see that, beginning in the fall of 2012, a significant share of ultras' protests began to target President Mohamed Morsi, even though he had not been in office at the time of the massacre. The reason was that Morsi's handling of the fallout from the massacre was poor, and, by early 2013, it became difficult to dispute that he held some responsibility for the continuing lack of justice for the martyred ultras members. He refused to reform the police or put senior security officials on trial for the massacre, and he allowed for the re-starting of the football league, which had been paused after the crisis. One ultras member explained to us how a protest over the restarting of the football league naturally came to be directed at Morsi: "We were protesting in Cairo anyway to stop the league, because we felt that we couldn't have the league before we finish the trial. And we went from the stadium to the presidential palace...just to tell Morsi 'no league.' Our blood was still on the ground."⁸⁸

Ultimately, by the end of Morsi's term, the ultras had become one of his staunchest critics. Moreover, as they mobilized over their fairly narrow grievances related to the

Port Said crisis, they formed ties with activist groups in the secularist opposition. In the spring of 2013, these secularist groups were persistently calling on Morsi to step down, and the ultras joined many of these events. A movement called Tamarod was launched in May 2013 and led a petition campaign calling for Morsi's resignation and early presidential elections. Many ultras became enthusiastic supporters.⁸⁹ In other words, by the end of the Morsi presidency, the ultras, who had been among the staunchest and most consistent opponents of the military since January 2011, had channeled their unmet grievances into a nationwide movement that ultimately resulted in that very same military returning to power. Their open-ended allegiances and narrow focus on police and state abuse had drawn them first to revolution, and then to counterrevolution.⁹⁰

Conclusion

In this article we have brought a new definition, new theory, and new evidence to bear on a longstanding debate regarding the revolutionary potential of lumpenproletarians in authoritarian regimes. First, we have defined lumpenproletarians as a marginal class of workers in the urban informal economies of the developing world whose work is individual, irregular, and requires no formal training. The unique nature of lumpenproletarian work has then led us to several theoretical intuitions about the conditions under which the group might mobilize. We have explained that we do not expect lumpenproletarians to join conventional political or labor movements. But we do expect the informal nature of their work to generate frequent hostile interactions with state authorities, especially as governments around the world seek to better regulate and monitor their informal sectors. Combined with the group's biographical availability, these conflictual relations with the state ought to make lumpenproletarians recruitable to protests over government misconduct.

Next, we have used this definition and theory to study the contentious behavior of lumpenproletarians in two authoritarian countries that have large grey economies but have experienced starkly different recent political trajectories. In China, we have shown that lumpenproletarians occasionally get drawn into protests, primarily when the issue in question is an act of state misconduct, especially involving the police. Chinese lumpenproletarian mobilizations are further marked by their spontaneity, apolitical demands, and bystander involvement. What these protests have lacked to date are organizations to channel them and broader movements for their participants to join. As a consequence, confrontations involving lumpenproletarians in China have quickly fizzled out. In Egypt, we observe very similar dynamics among street vendors and taxi drivers during the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. However, the experience of Egyptian ultras in the same period shows that when lumpenproletarians have organizational resources at their disposal, they can sustain longer campaigns, albeit over the same issues of abuse by the government and security forces. Moreover, the ultras case demonstrates that lumpenproletarians' narrow grievances and open-ended commitments make them susceptible to cooptation by groups pursuing a variety of political ends.

Our findings thus resonate with both sides of the old debate about lumpenproletarians. The day-to-day experiences of these people, as Fanon believed, have forged them into one of the “most spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces,” especially when it comes to confronting the state’s coercive agents. However, our research also validates the concerns of Marx and Engels that marginalized people might act as the “tool of reactionary intrigue.” Political disengagement combined with cynicism toward the state breeds a blanket antagonism to authority that does not distinguish between different political forces. This means that anti-democratic efforts, like those that unseated Morsi, can also receive lumpenproletarian backing.

The article represents a preliminary attempt to bring lumpenproletarians into empirical analyses of mass mobilization and regime change. There are aspects of the group and its actions that we have not addressed. For instance, we have not explored the place of gender in the incidents we study: what does it mean that ultras members are mainly young men? We hope others will fill in gaps like this. Regardless, the subject of lumpenproletarian resistance demands further scholarly attention. As noted in our theory section, even as formal sector jobs are under threat around the developing world, authoritarian regimes are devoting increasing resources to campaigns aimed at rationalizing, regulating, and displacing their vast informal sectors. These campaigns are likely to lead to a rise in precisely the kind of encounters that we argue generate contention among lumpenproletarians. We should therefore expect marginalized people to mobilize with increasing frequency, elevating their relevance as a social class and their likely contributions to major political transformations like the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution.

NOTES

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15. Clyde Barrow defines the group as "not functionally part of the capitalist mode of production, because it neither produces nor appropriates surplus value as a result of its structural location within capitalist relations of production." See Barrow. This definition is compatible with ours, as marginal informal workers rarely produce or appropriate surplus value. However, we prefer our definition as its criteria are easier to apply in empirical research.

16. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines informal workers as those who are not "in law or in practice...subject to national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits." See ILO, *Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture*, 3rd ed. (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2018). This group includes some whom we call lumpenproletarians. However, it also includes some, like owners of unregistered businesses with multiple employees, who would not count.

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62. *al-Shorouk*, Feb. 3, 2011.
63. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Feb. 2, 2011.
64. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Feb. 8, 2011.
65. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Feb. 9, 2011.
66. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Feb. 10, 2011.
67. Ismail.
68. Bayat.
69. Ismail says that the "key features" of urban subalterns are "informality in economic activities and housing." See Ismail, 870.
70. *Ibid.*, 874.
71. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Feb. 20, 2012.
72. *al-Masry al-Youm*, Jan. 7, 2013, May 14, 2013, May 25, 2013.
73. Ronnie Close, *Cairo's Ultras: Resistance and Revolution in Egypt's Football Culture* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2019); Carl Rommel, *Egypt's Football Revolution: Emotion, Masculinity, and Uneasy Politics* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2021).
74. Author interview with Ahlawy Ultras member, September 2018, Istanbul.
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76. Two other scholars who have studied the ultras extensively also note their lower-class profile (though they do not use the term lumpenproletarian). They also point out their connection to Cairo's informal quarters. See Close, 19; Shawk El-Zatmah, "From Terso into Ultras: the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the Radicalization of the Soccer's Ultra-Fans," *Soccer & Society*, 13 (November 2012), 801–13; Ismail.
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82. Author interview with co-founder of 6 April Youth, August 2011, Cairo, Egypt.
83. Author interview with Ahlawy Ultras member, September 2018, Istanbul.
84. El-Zatmah. These accusations have largely been confirmed by television and phone camera footage.
85. Clarke, 2020.
86. For further information on this dataset, see Killian Clarke, "Which Protests Count? Coverage Bias in Middle East Event Datasets," *Mediterranean Politics*, (July 2021), 1–27.
87. Amar, 594.

88. Author interview with Ahlawy Ultras member, September 2018, Istanbul.

89. See James Dorsey, "Egypt Declares 74 Dead Soccer Fans Martyrs of the Revolution," *The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer*, 2013, <https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2013/01/egypt-declares-74-dead-soccer-fans.html>. The ultras' contributions to the Tamarod campaign were also confirmed by one of Tamarod's co-founders (author interview with Tamarod co-founder, February 2018, Cairo). See also: Mohsen Samika, Ahmed Allam, and Khaled Shamy, "قطار التمرد يجوب الصعيد" [The Tamarod train roams Upper Egypt], *al-Masry al-Youm*, Jun. 6, 2013.

90. A similar argument has been made about the role of labor in the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution by Joel Beinin, *Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). Here, too, the somewhat narrow and local nature of independent workers' demands prompted them to join the revolutionary movement of 2011, but also turned them against the Morsi presidency and drew them into the counterrevolutionary Tamarod movement.

APPENDIX

The following tables and figures accompany the article “Power on the Margins: Lumpen-proletarian Resistance in China and Egypt” published in the *Journal of Comparative Politics*. Table 1 enumerates the number of Egyptian football ultras who were killed during the Port Said Massacre, organized by their hometown districts in Egypt (based on data from *Wikithawra*). Figures 1 and 2 show the number of ultras protests and the number of participants in ultras protests by week, based on the original protest dataset described in the article. Finally, Table 2 replicates the statistical analyses in Table 2 of the article, using secondary demand categories instead of primary demand categories. It reveals that protests over “police abuse” were the most likely to elicit ultras participation during the post-revolution transition period.

Table 1 Home Districts and Governorates of Martyrs in Port Said Massacre

District	Governorate	Number Martyrs
Imbaba	Giza	5
Bulaq al-Dakrou	Giza	5
Faysal	Giza	4
Unknown	Unknown	4
Shubra	Cairo	3
Faraskur	Damietta	3
Harm	Giza	3
Tagammu-2	Cairo	2
Zahour	Cairo	2
Matareyya	Cairo	2
Hadayek Qubba	Cairo	2
Khalifa	Cairo	2
Mahalla al-Kubra	Gharbia	2
Shaykh Zayed	Giza	2
Talibiyya	Giza	2
Omraniyya	Giza	2
Shubra al-Kheima	Qalyubiyya	2
Maharam Bik	Alexandria	1
Azbakeyya	Cairo	1
Zawiya Hamra	Cairo	1
Sayyeda Zeinab	Cairo	1
Shuhada	Cairo	1
Abaseyya	Cairo	1
Muqattam	Cairo	1
Bab al-Shaariyya	Cairo	1
Dar al-Salam	Cairo	1
Rod Farg	Cairo	1

(Continued)

Table 1 (continued)

District	Governorate	Number Martyrs
Ain Shams	Cairo	1
Nasser City	Cairo	1
Heliopolis	Cairo	1
Mansoura	Dakhaliyya	1
Damietta	Damietta	1
Osim	Giza	1
Dokki	Giza	1
Agouza	Giza	1
Warraq	Giza	1
Port Fouad	Port Said	1
Qanater al-Khairiya	Qalyubiyya	1
Banha	Qalyubiyya	1
Zagazig	Sharqiyya	1
Bilbis	Sharqiyya	1
Arbain	Suez	1

Source: Wikithawra

Figure 1 Weekly Number of Ultras Protests, Jan 2012-Jun 2013




Figure 2 Weekly Number of Participants in Ultras Protests, Jan 2012-Jun 2013




Table 2 Likelihood of Ultras Participation by Secondary Demand Type (Odds Ratios)

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Ultras participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Repression / police violence	18.631*** (18.934)	20.193*** (20.561)	20.113*** (20.545)
Arrests / detention	1.535 (1.637)	1.869 (1.998)	1.761 (1.890)
Constitution	0.672 (0.831)	0.899 (1.115)	0.870 (1.085)
Contracts	0.209 (0.297)	0.333 (0.475)	0.396 (0.568)
Corruption in business	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Corruption in politics	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Corruption in politics/government	1.375 (1.971)	2.049 (2.947)	1.933 (2.800)
Corruption of police	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.0005)
Cost of living	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Crime	1.257 (1.469)	1.694 (1.988)	1.493 (1.767)

(Continued)

Table 2 (continued)

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Ultras participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Demanding security	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Education	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Elections	2.146 (2.433)	2.408 (2.736)	2.267 (2.595)
Ethiopian dam	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Fired	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Freedom of speech / protest	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Garbage	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.0005)	0.00000 (0.001)
Government opposition	1.558 (1.587)	1.728 (1.763)	1.820 (1.865)
Government support	1.527 (1.614)	1.495 (1.582)	1.621 (1.722)
Gulf	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Health	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Hiring	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Infrastructure	0.00000 (0.00004)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
International trade/IMF/World Bank	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.0004)
Iran	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Job security / promotions	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Jurisdiction	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Land use	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Local opposition	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Local support	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0004)
Minority rights (religious)	1.419 (2.035)	1.395 (2.004)	1.627 (2.343)

(Continued)

Table 2 (continued)

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Ultras participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Opposing religion in public life	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.0005)	0.00000 (0.0005)
Opposing union	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Other	6.246* (6.395)	7.502** (7.695)	7.485* (7.709)
Palestine/Israel	0.880 (1.258)	0.881 (1.261)	0.978 (1.403)
Parliament opposition	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Parliament support	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.0005)
Party opposition	0.923 (1.078)	0.997 (1.165)	1.070 (1.255)
Party support	0.530 (0.756)	0.525 (0.750)	0.458 (0.657)
Pollution	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0004)
Prison conditions / sentencing	6.684* (7.069)	8.413** (8.928)	5.989* (6.422)
Regional inequality	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.004)	0.00000 (0.010)
Religious freedom	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Retirement	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Rights of businessmen	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Social welfare program	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Subsidies	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.0004)
Supporting religion in public life	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0002)
Terrorism / militancy	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Unemployment	0.00000 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.00000 (0.001)
United States	0.721 (1.030)	0.703 (1.005)	0.832 (1.196)
Wages	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)

(Continued)

Table 2 (continued)

	<i>Dependent variable</i>		
	Ultras participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wages	0.069* (0.099)	0.130 (0.186)	0.142 (0.203)
Women's rights	1.833 (2.634)	1.722 (2.480)	1.811 (2.614)
Working conditions	0.129 (0.184)	0.223 (0.319)	0.255 (0.365)
Constant	0.023*** (0.023)	0.000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
Governorate FEs Tactic Controls		✓	✓ ✓
Observations	7,522	7,522	7,522
Log Likelihood	-957.082	-934.796	-878.901
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,026.164	2,003.591	1,945.801

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01